Sammyboy RSS Feed
15-04-2016, 08:30 PM
An honorable member of the Coffee Shop Has Just Posted the Following:
http://stanford.edu/~shengwu/Shengwu_Li_CV.pdf
Shengwu Li
[email protected]
http://www.stanford.edu/~shengwu
Department of Economics
Stanford University
579 Serra Mall
Stanford, CA 94305-6072
Mobile: (650) 704-5950
EDUCATION
Ph.D. Candidate in Economics, Stanford University (ongoing)
M.Phil in Economics, University of Oxford, 2011
with Distinction
B.A. (Hons) in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics, University of Oxford, 2009
First-Class Honors
RESEARCH FIELDS
Microeconomic Theory, Behavioral Economics, Experimental Economics, Market
Design
WORKING PAPERS
Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms
What makes some strategy-proof mechanisms easier to understand than others? To
address this question, I propose a new solution concept: A mechanism is obviously
strategy-proof (OSP) if it has an equilibrium in obviously dominant strategies. This has a
behavioral interpretation: A strategy is obviously dominant if and only if a cognitively
limited agent can recognize it as weakly dominant. It also has a classical interpretation: A
choice rule is OSP-implementable if and only if it can be carried out by a social planner
under a particular regime of partial commitment. I fully characterize the set of OSP
mechanisms in a canonical setting, with one-dimensional types and quasi-linear utility. A
laboratory experiment tests and corroborates the theory.
Dynamic Matching Market Design (with Mohammad Akbarpour and Shayan Oveis-
Gharan)
We introduce a model of dynamic matching in networked markets. Agents arrive and
depart stochastically, and the composition of the trade network depends endogenously
on the matching algorithm. We show that if the planner can identify agents who are
about to depart, then waiting to thicken the market is highly valuable, and if the planner
cannot identify such agents, then matching agents greedily is close to optimal. We
characterize the optimal waiting time as a function of waiting costs. The planner's
decision problem in our model involves a combinatorially complex state space. However,
we show that simple local algorithms that choose the right time to match agents, but do
not exploit the global network structure, can perform close to complex optimal
algorithms. Finally, we consider a setting where agents have private information about
their departure times, and design a continuous-time dynamic mechanism to elicit this
information.
Belief Updating and the Demand for Information (with Sandro Ambuehl)
How do individuals value noisy information that guides economic decisions? In our
laboratory experiment, we find that individuals underreact to increasing the
informativeness of a signal, thus undervalue high-quality information, and that they
disproportionately prefer information that may yield certainty. Both biases are entirely
due to non-standard belief updating, rather than due to non-standard risk preferences.
We find that individuals differ consistently in their responsiveness to information; i.e. the
extent that their beliefs move upon observing signals. Individual parameters of
responsiveness to information have out-of-sample explanatory power in two distinct
choice environments and are unrelated to proxies for mathematical aptitude.
Carpe Diem, Carpe Worm: Context Effects as Explained by Foraging Theory
(with Neil Yu)
This paper reconciles two seemingly competing explanations of context-dependent
choice, one invoking psychological mechanisms, and the other Bayesian learning. We
prove that standard context effects are features of the optimal solution to a general
dynamic stochastic resource-acquisition problem. The model has two key ingredients:
intertemporal substitution and learning about the environment. Interpreted as a
description of animal foraging behavior, it explains why context effects might be
adaptive in nature. Interpreted as a description of consumer choice problems, it suggests
that context effects might result from rational inference. A simple experiment shows that
the latter interpretation sometimes holds.
RELEVANT POSITIONS
2015 Teaching Assistant - Undergraduate Game Theory
2014-15 Research Assistant for Prof. A. Roth, Stanford University
2012-14 Research Assistant for Prof. M. Niederle, Stanford University
2010 Visiting Scholar, Stanford University
2008 Marjorie Deane Financial Journalism intern, The Economist
SCHOLARSHIPS, HONORS, AND AWARDS
2015 Kohlhagen Fellow in Economics
2015 Outstanding Teaching Assistant Award (Undergraduate Game Theory)
2014 Fellowship at the Stanford Center for Ethics and Society
2013-14 Best Second Year Paper Prize (Stanford PhD Program)
2011-12 Graduate Fellowship, Stanford University Department of Economics
2011 George Webb Medley Prize (best examination performance in the M.Phil)
2009-11 Clarendon Scholarship
2009-11 Overseas Research Scholarship
2009 Hicks and Webb Prize (best economics examination performance in
Oxford)
2008 James Hall Scholarship
2007 Thomas Balogh Prize for Political Economy
PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES
Conference Presentations:
Simons Institute (CS and Economics), Berkeley, USA, 2015
Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics: Psychology and Economics, Stanford,
USA, 2015
Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics: Theory, Stanford, USA, 2015
Bay Area Behavioral and Experimental Economics Workshop, Santa Cruz, USA, 2015
INSEAD Symposium, Fontainebleau, France, 2014
Jerusalem School in Economic Theory, Jerusalem, Israel, 2013
Grants:
Russell Sage Grant, 2015 (US$4,634)
Refereeing:
AEJ Micro, Review of Economic Studies, Econometrica
SPEECH AND DEBATE
2009 Champion of the European Universities Debating Championship
2010 Best Speaker1 (World Universities Debating Championship)
2009-11 Debate Coach, The Oxford Union
2011- Debate Coach, Stanford University
Click here to view the whole thread at www.sammyboy.com (http://www.sammyboy.com/showthread.php?228225-LHL-and-LSF-s-son-non-scholar-but-scholarly&goto=newpost).
http://stanford.edu/~shengwu/Shengwu_Li_CV.pdf
Shengwu Li
[email protected]
http://www.stanford.edu/~shengwu
Department of Economics
Stanford University
579 Serra Mall
Stanford, CA 94305-6072
Mobile: (650) 704-5950
EDUCATION
Ph.D. Candidate in Economics, Stanford University (ongoing)
M.Phil in Economics, University of Oxford, 2011
with Distinction
B.A. (Hons) in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics, University of Oxford, 2009
First-Class Honors
RESEARCH FIELDS
Microeconomic Theory, Behavioral Economics, Experimental Economics, Market
Design
WORKING PAPERS
Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms
What makes some strategy-proof mechanisms easier to understand than others? To
address this question, I propose a new solution concept: A mechanism is obviously
strategy-proof (OSP) if it has an equilibrium in obviously dominant strategies. This has a
behavioral interpretation: A strategy is obviously dominant if and only if a cognitively
limited agent can recognize it as weakly dominant. It also has a classical interpretation: A
choice rule is OSP-implementable if and only if it can be carried out by a social planner
under a particular regime of partial commitment. I fully characterize the set of OSP
mechanisms in a canonical setting, with one-dimensional types and quasi-linear utility. A
laboratory experiment tests and corroborates the theory.
Dynamic Matching Market Design (with Mohammad Akbarpour and Shayan Oveis-
Gharan)
We introduce a model of dynamic matching in networked markets. Agents arrive and
depart stochastically, and the composition of the trade network depends endogenously
on the matching algorithm. We show that if the planner can identify agents who are
about to depart, then waiting to thicken the market is highly valuable, and if the planner
cannot identify such agents, then matching agents greedily is close to optimal. We
characterize the optimal waiting time as a function of waiting costs. The planner's
decision problem in our model involves a combinatorially complex state space. However,
we show that simple local algorithms that choose the right time to match agents, but do
not exploit the global network structure, can perform close to complex optimal
algorithms. Finally, we consider a setting where agents have private information about
their departure times, and design a continuous-time dynamic mechanism to elicit this
information.
Belief Updating and the Demand for Information (with Sandro Ambuehl)
How do individuals value noisy information that guides economic decisions? In our
laboratory experiment, we find that individuals underreact to increasing the
informativeness of a signal, thus undervalue high-quality information, and that they
disproportionately prefer information that may yield certainty. Both biases are entirely
due to non-standard belief updating, rather than due to non-standard risk preferences.
We find that individuals differ consistently in their responsiveness to information; i.e. the
extent that their beliefs move upon observing signals. Individual parameters of
responsiveness to information have out-of-sample explanatory power in two distinct
choice environments and are unrelated to proxies for mathematical aptitude.
Carpe Diem, Carpe Worm: Context Effects as Explained by Foraging Theory
(with Neil Yu)
This paper reconciles two seemingly competing explanations of context-dependent
choice, one invoking psychological mechanisms, and the other Bayesian learning. We
prove that standard context effects are features of the optimal solution to a general
dynamic stochastic resource-acquisition problem. The model has two key ingredients:
intertemporal substitution and learning about the environment. Interpreted as a
description of animal foraging behavior, it explains why context effects might be
adaptive in nature. Interpreted as a description of consumer choice problems, it suggests
that context effects might result from rational inference. A simple experiment shows that
the latter interpretation sometimes holds.
RELEVANT POSITIONS
2015 Teaching Assistant - Undergraduate Game Theory
2014-15 Research Assistant for Prof. A. Roth, Stanford University
2012-14 Research Assistant for Prof. M. Niederle, Stanford University
2010 Visiting Scholar, Stanford University
2008 Marjorie Deane Financial Journalism intern, The Economist
SCHOLARSHIPS, HONORS, AND AWARDS
2015 Kohlhagen Fellow in Economics
2015 Outstanding Teaching Assistant Award (Undergraduate Game Theory)
2014 Fellowship at the Stanford Center for Ethics and Society
2013-14 Best Second Year Paper Prize (Stanford PhD Program)
2011-12 Graduate Fellowship, Stanford University Department of Economics
2011 George Webb Medley Prize (best examination performance in the M.Phil)
2009-11 Clarendon Scholarship
2009-11 Overseas Research Scholarship
2009 Hicks and Webb Prize (best economics examination performance in
Oxford)
2008 James Hall Scholarship
2007 Thomas Balogh Prize for Political Economy
PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES
Conference Presentations:
Simons Institute (CS and Economics), Berkeley, USA, 2015
Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics: Psychology and Economics, Stanford,
USA, 2015
Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics: Theory, Stanford, USA, 2015
Bay Area Behavioral and Experimental Economics Workshop, Santa Cruz, USA, 2015
INSEAD Symposium, Fontainebleau, France, 2014
Jerusalem School in Economic Theory, Jerusalem, Israel, 2013
Grants:
Russell Sage Grant, 2015 (US$4,634)
Refereeing:
AEJ Micro, Review of Economic Studies, Econometrica
SPEECH AND DEBATE
2009 Champion of the European Universities Debating Championship
2010 Best Speaker1 (World Universities Debating Championship)
2009-11 Debate Coach, The Oxford Union
2011- Debate Coach, Stanford University
Click here to view the whole thread at www.sammyboy.com (http://www.sammyboy.com/showthread.php?228225-LHL-and-LSF-s-son-non-scholar-but-scholarly&goto=newpost).